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1. Introduction 35 
The unprepossessing landscape of Toronto’s post-industrial waterfront has become the unlikely setting 36 
for what is arguably the boldest and most ambitious “smart city” design ever to emerge in North America. 37 
Far from being a purely local matter, the proposed regeneration of the Quayside area of the waterfront is 38 
  
already a national and international reference point for the burgeoning debate about the scope and limits 39 
of the digitally enabled ‘smart city’ narrative (Skok, 2019; Shieber, 2019; Wakefield, 2019; Won, 2018). 40 
Indeed, the debate in Toronto embraces many of the themes that have surfaced elsewhere under the 41 
‘smart city’ moniker, such as techno-centric versus citizen-centric perspectives on urban innovation 42 
(Cardullo and Kitchin, 2018); data governance issues around privacy and security (van Zoonen, 2016; 43 
Kitchin, 2016); the extent to which ‘smart urbanism’ fosters or frustrates urban sustainability (Cugurollo, 44 
2018; Haarstad, 2007); the integrity of the public sphere, where governments are expected to exercise a 45 
duty of care (Rodríguez Bolívar, 2016); and the role of profit-seeking technology vendors that are 46 
marketing their wares to city mayors as panaceas for a wide array of urban planning problems (Viitanen 47 
and Kingston, 2014; Wiig, 2015).  48 
But why does a local regeneration project have such global resonance? The main reason it resonates is 49 
because of the corporate identity of the designer – Sidewalk Labs (SL). SL is an affiliate of Google and both 50 
are subsidiaries of Alphabet, the parent company. The Quayside project signals the entry of a Google 51 
affiliate into the realm of ‘smart urbanism’, as yet another ‘corporate storyteller’ (Söderström, et al., 52 
2014), in the most dramatic fashion imaginable. While most big tech vendors are content to supply 53 
various combinations of technology and services (McNeill, 2015), SL sees the waterfront as an opportunity 54 
to engage in a unique place-making experiment that would marry digital technology with urban design 55 
and physical planning like never before (Pandey and Soto, 2019). This was evident from the public 56 
announcement of the project, when Eric Schmidt, Google’s former executive chair, said that the project 57 
allowed them to realise their long-running dream for “someone to give us a city and put us in charge” 58 
(Balsillie, 2018, para.2).  59 
The aim of this article is to analyse Sidewalk Labs’ attempt to develop and control the narrative behind 60 
this ‘smart city’ experiment and identify the extent to which the public interest is exercised by various 61 
actors within the planning process as a means of countering private interests. It does this by first situating 62 
the Toronto case in the literature on ‘smart urbanism’ and the ‘public interest’ to highlight the critical 63 
perspectives of urban scholars in Section 2. Section 3 examines the origins and evolution of the 64 
partnership between Waterfront Toronto and SL. Section 4 identifies the key issues that have exercised 65 
local critics of the plan, such as the public/private balance of power, the role of civil society, and the 66 
planning process. Ultimately, we argue that despite more citizen-centric efforts, there remains a need for 67 
appropriate advocates to protect and promote the wider public interest as the smart city emerges as a 68 
means to moderate the tensions that exist between techno-centric and citizen-centric dimensions of 69 
smart cities. 70 
2. Smart City Narratives: Critical Perspectives on Smart Urbanism 71 
Urban scholars have spent more than a decade debating the nature of the ‘smart city’ and many of them 72 
have concluded that it is virtually impossible to understand it in the abstract because it assumes so many 73 
diverse forms in practice, prompting one scholar to call for ‘the real smart city’ to stand up (Hollands, 74 
2008). But the fact of the matter is that, given these manifold forms, there is no such thing as the “real” 75 
smart city. What we have instead is a wide array of smart city narratives, many of which are techno-76 
centric narratives, with a growing minority concerned to explore more sustainable or progressive 77 
narratives. Before addressing these thematic narratives we need to appreciate what is arguably the most 78 
significant aspect of all smart city narratives – namely the smart discourse (Joss et al, 2019). 79 
Consciously or not, the ‘smart city’ discourse frames concepts, policies and investment strategies because 80 
it informs and fashions the cognitive maps that constitute dynamic, innovative and well-managed cities. 81 
Indeed, some scholars now claim that the smart city can be considered a ‘global discourse network” (Joss 82 
et al., 2019). This claim is based on a webometric analysis of ten smart city dimensions that generated a 83 
  
cluster of more than two dozen widely cited cities, a group that included all the cities listed in the ‘top ten 84 
smart cities on the planet’, namely: Vienna, Toronto, Paris, NYC, London, Tokyo, Berlin, Copenhagen, 85 
Hong Kong and Barcelona (Cohen, 2012). The conclusions of the webometric analysis were twofold. 86 
Firstly, that ‘it is no coincidence that the 27 cities identified here form the core of the global discourse 87 
network. As (mostly) capital and world cities, backed by national governments and promoted by 88 
international organizations and business, they have evidently seized the opportunity to place themselves 89 
at the heart of the evolving smart city agenda, using it concurrently to promote urban renewal to their 90 
domestic audiences and to signal their global ambitions to foreign audiences, and in doing so frequently 91 
engaging in mutual cross-referencing’ (Joss et al., 2019, p.23). Secondly, the authors detect a complex 92 
shift in the discourse regime as regards urban governance inasmuch as it ‘entails calls for a disruptive 93 
(seen as positive) change of society: references to outmoded twentieth-century governance models, the 94 
need for fundamental transformation, even a whole new way of thinking etc., together make clear the 95 
smart city’s ambition to reach profoundly into the social realm’ (Joss et al., 2019, p.23).  96 
Although we can debate the merits of the webometric methodology, these two conclusions deserve to be 97 
taken seriously (a) because a group of prominent cities is clearly being touted as beacons for all other 98 
cities to emulate in the spurious name of “global best practice” and (b) because the socially “disruptive” 99 
ambitions of smart city discourse are far from being wholly benign as we will see in Toronto. Already we 100 
can identify examples of global interest by government in smart cities, from the European Commission’s 101 
Smart City Solutions (GrowSmarter, 2015), India’s Smart City Mission (Ministry of Urban Development, 102 
2017), to the UK Future Cities Initiative (TSB, 2012), and the United States’ Smart City Challenge (US 103 
Department of Transportation, n.d.). Yet we can also detect where the enthusiasm for these sorts of 104 
smart city initiatives has resulted in more variegated impacts on the ground where, business interests 105 
have been prioritised (Grossi & Pianezzi, 2017), smart city governance has undermined more local 106 
democratically elected bodies (Praharaj et al., 2018), and national programmes have emphasised external 107 
export opportunities rather than improvements to cities (Buck & While, 2017). 108 
At the core of most smart city narratives is a paean to the formidable technical power of Information and 109 
Communications Technologies (ICTs). Like all technologies, it is a technical power that has no pre-110 
ordained social and spatial trajectory because it is contingent on how and in whose interests it is 111 
deployed. But if the early deployment of ICT is any guide, the impact of smart urbanism could be both 112 
socially and spatially uneven (Moss, 1987; Morgan, 1992; Graham and Marvin, 2001). Because long before 113 
smart city narratives emerged, urban scholars like Mitchell Moss were among the first to explore the 114 
implications of ICT for the spaces and flows of urban life. In a celebrated analysis he correctly identified 115 
that the diffusion of ICTs would lead not to the ‘end of agglomeration’ or the ‘death of distance’ as some 116 
technophiles were predicting but, rather, to the bifurcation of space as advanced business services were 117 
centralized in a few principal world cities, ‘while simultaneously leading to the dispersion of routine 118 
information-based activities to the periphery of the metropolitan regions surrounding the largest central 119 
cities’ (Moss, 1987, pp.534-546). 120 
Notwithstanding these critical findings, the vast majority of smart city narratives have been so enthralled 121 
by the technological possibilities of digitally-connected urban infrastructures and data-driven services that 122 
they constitute a form of techno-utopianism (Wiig, 2015; Söderström et al., 2014). As these scholars have 123 
demonstrated, this techno-centric discourse owes a great deal to the highly successful marketing 124 
campaign that IBM launched after 2008. Having developed its smart city concept through consultancy 125 
work in Masdar City and Rio de Janeirio, IBM sought to market the idea more broadly through a challenge 126 
exercise, the Smarter Cities Challenge. IBM announced the Challenge in 2010 and chose the first round of 127 
24 cities later that year, though the company was slow to realise that the main attraction for the cities 128 
was as much IBM’s corporate imprimatur as its smart city technology. When asked why cities applied to 129 
the Smarter Cities Challenge, the IBM Director said: ‘[The Smarter Cities Challenge] generated huge 130 
interest from cities all over the world, even though we hadn't really begun to explain what the business 131 
  
case was for these things, what the return on investment was going to be, how much money could we help 132 
you save. [ … ] It took us a long time to understand that what was really driving this sort of thing is 133 
economic development’ (Wiig, 2015, p.262).  In other words, cities were using the IBM challenge as a 134 
place-marketing exercise to signal to international investors that, despite the economic downturn, they 135 
remained ‘open for business’ (Wiig, 2015).  136 
If techno-centric narratives dominated the first wave of smart city discourse, recent years have witnessed 137 
a new wave of critical perspectives that aim to explore more progressive citizen-centric narratives. 138 
Drawing on the work of some of the early critics (eg. Graham & Marvin, 2001; Hollands, 2008), Vanolo 139 
summarises the concerns of many critical scholars when he argued that “the smart city discourse 140 
distances urban government from politics and represents the urban question in terms of the environment 141 
and technology, broadening the field of action of technicians, consultants and private companies” 142 
(Vanolo, 2013, p.883). Two dangers flow from such a discourse. Firstly, the techno-centric discourse 143 
presents itself as “natural” and “univocal” and effectively seeks to de-politicize the urban planning 144 
agenda. Secondly, a single techno-centric vision of the city of the future restricts the horizon of any 145 
imaginative planning options, foreclosing the debate about “alternative solutions to the problems of 146 
today and tomorrow” (Vanolo, 2013, p.894).  147 
The new wave of critical perspectives provides a belated opportunity for robust debate about the scope 148 
and limits of smart urbanism and its potential for fostering or frustrating urban wellbeing. The critical 149 
scholars of this new wave are addressing issues that have been elided hitherto, like the need to overcome 150 
the tokenistic attitude to citizen engagement in smart city narratives and the necessity to give more 151 
prominence to ‘the place of the public’ (Joss, 2018); the need to be more alive to the ethical issues 152 
associated with the erosion of privacy through persistent and systemic mass surveillance (Kitchen, 2019); 153 
the need to be more aware of the “anti-planning” thrust of smart city experimentalism, which threatens 154 
to undermine the normative values of traditional technologies of planning (Cowley & Caprotti,  2019) and 155 
the need to confront the spurious nature of the smart city’s credentials as regards social and 156 
environmental sustainability (Viitanen and Kingston, 2014). But critical scholars are also beginning to 157 
appreciate the need to move beyond pure critique to explore the scope for more progressive models of 158 
actually existing smart urbanism (SU). The positive case was well made recently by McFarlane and 159 
Soderstom, who issued the following political plea: ‘We need to engage in the analysis of the variegated 160 
forms that ‘real’ SU takes on the ground, both in the urban policies of national governments and 161 
municipalities, and in the grass-roots initiatives and social movements that disturb, resist or create their 162 
versions of SU’ (Mcfarlane and Soderstrom, 2017, p.313). 163 
Early smart city initiatives were rife with examples of corporate domination and rhetoric (McNeil, 2015; 164 
Paroutis, et al., 2014; Söderström et al., 2014). Many of these developments failed to prioritise local 165 
citizen engagement as they sought to maximise the influence of their proprietary technologies within 166 
cities, such as Rio de Janeiro’s smart city investments (Gaffney & Robertson, 2016). As identified in 167 
Curitiba, Brazil, smart city developments need to better engage with community and participatory forms 168 
of governance in order to improve well-being (Macke et al., 2018). Yet there are also later cases of smart 169 
city developments that have prioritised local community engagement above wider corporate interests, 170 
such as Newcastle, Australia, and in doing so achieve success through the local institutionalisation of 171 
smart policies and government ownership of infrastructure (Dowling et al., 2018). Similarly, Amsterdam 172 
has sought to develop its smart city strategy through “an approach closely linked to strategic urban 173 
planning principles … based on strategic thinking, collaboration, and inclusive criteria” (Mora & Bolici, 174 
2015, p.261) designed to ensure the broader public interest is served. 175 
Planning has long justified its ability to intervene in the built environment on the basis of acting in the 176 
public interest (Alexander, 2002). While the profession has often debated what is meant by the concept 177 
(Campbell & Marshall 2002; Murphy & Fox-Rogers, 2015), it is regularly invoked as a means of plan 178 
  
evaluation in practice (Alexander, 2002) and an ethical norm (Howe, 1994) by planners. More broadly, 179 
concepts of the public interest have extended to considerations of planning for justice (Basta, 2015; 180 
Schlosberg, 2013, Fainstein, 2010). This idea of a universal public interest has however been contested, 181 
particularly in relation to criticism of planning’s technocratic rational comprehensive model and the 182 
recognition of the plurality of interests inherent within planning processes (Lindblom, 1959; Sandercock, 183 
1998).  184 
The rise of the entrepreneurial city in the 1990s provided further reflection for the planning profession on 185 
the role of the public interest in practice (McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001) and examination of the role of 186 
collaborative planning to address the local diversity of voices present within communities (Healey, 1997). 187 
While Healey argued that a ‘common’ public interest may no longer exist due to a recognition of the 188 
heterogeneity of communities she still suggested that a public interest which can “reflect the diversity of 189 
our interests” (Healey, 1997, p.297) was possible and important so long as it was representative and 190 
discursive. Campbell and Marshall (2002, p.181) however note that “given the deep divisions of interest 191 
within society, the persistence of disagreement and the prevalence of discord and conflict it seems 192 
unlikely that a consensus can be discursively constructed” and as such “argue that choices cannot be left 193 
endlessly open” (p.182). In full recognition of the need to try and represent the diversity of views, the 194 
state, and planning’s central role within it, therefore often attempts to construct the public interest. 195 
Drawing on a case study of Toronto’s Quayside development we examine the process of plan-making by 196 
SL and Waterfront Toronto in relation to the public interest, both procedurally and substantively, through 197 
an examination of an extensive array of corporate and government publications, media reports, and 198 
online discussions in the public domain. Procedurally Alexander (2002, p.234) suggests the public interest 199 
can be “effectively operationalized through socially adopted and legally enforced norms and rules of due 200 
process, sound administration, and reasonable decision-making“. While substantively plans may be 201 
assessed on the extent to which they enhance “the welfare of all the parties affected by a plan’s impacts” 202 
(Alexander, 2002, p.238). Through the lens of the public interest, we aim to explore the variable 203 
disruptive effects emerging between techno-centric narratives and citizen-centric narratives of smart 204 
urbanism and the role of planning in what we believe to be the boldest smart city design ever proposed 205 
for a North American city – SL’s plan for the regeneration of Toronto’s waterfront. 206 
3. Positioning Toronto’s Smart City 207 
Toronto’s rise towards one of North America’s largest technology hubs has been rapid. A city of 2.9 208 
million people within a wider region of 5.9 million, CBRE, the largest commercial real estate services 209 
company in the world, proclaimed the city added twice as many new technology jobs (22,500) as San 210 
Francisco (11,540) in 2017 (CBRE, 2018). This saw the city move from 12th to 6th in the CBRE’s overall 211 
annual ranking. The most recent 2019 ranking shifted the city even higher to 3rd place behind the San 212 
Francisco Bay Area and Seattle. Toronto’s 54% increase in total technology occupations since 2013 was 213 
the fastest of all studied markets, nearly matching the number of technology jobs generated in the San 214 
Francisco Bay Area over the same period (CBRE, 2019). This boom in the technology sector saw many in 215 
Toronto’s business community eagerly embrace a Google affiliate company’s investment in the city, with 216 
the Toronto Board of Trade announcing Daniel Doctoroff, the CEO of Sidewalk Labs, was to headline their 217 
annual dinner a week after the initial selection of the company was made while praising that Sidewalk 218 
Labs involvement would bring the “global spotlight to our waterfront, establishing it - and Toronto - as a 219 
testbed for digital technology and urban innovation” (Toronto Board of Trade, 2017, 1). Urban 220 
innovations were in high demand in Toronto as its recent success brought with it a series of urban 221 
problems, making the city’s population potentially more susceptible to promises of digital solutions. 222 
Between 2006 and 2016 the city developed at a brisk pace, with a 9% increase in population (Statistics 223 
Canada, 2006; 2016) alongside a high-rise residential building boom that has put pressure on city centre 224 
amenities and services (City of Toronto, 2018). This increase in development coincided with house prices 225 
  
doubling between 2011 and 2019 (Real Estate Bay Realty Inc, 2019), political debate hindering 226 
investments in public transport (Walks, 2015), and inequality becoming more polarised within the city 227 
(Walks, et al., 2016). It was within this environment that Waterfront Toronto sought a partner to develop 228 
a 4.9 hectare site on the city’s industrial waterfront and Sidewalk Labs began to develop its narrative of 229 
digital placemaking solutions for Toronto’s ills. 230 
Waterfront Toronto (previously Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation until 2007) was 231 
established in 2002 as a tri-funded agency by the federal, provincial, and municipal governments to 232 
revitalise Toronto’s waterfront. Its mission was to facilitate the development of 1,149 hectares of private 233 
and public land in a coordinated manner, which it has sought to operationalise through a sustainability 234 
framework based on three pillars of economic development, social growth, and environmental protection 235 
(Bunce, 2009). The agency however lacks ownership and control over 99% of the land it is tasked to 236 
revitalise, does not have expropriation powers, and does not have zoning or planning control powers 237 
(OAG, 2018). Waterfront Toronto did however manage to gain sole ownership over a 4.9 hectare site less 238 
than 2km East of the downtown core known as ‘Quayside’, a largely vacant former industrial area. With 239 
this new-found opportunity and a new CEO, Will Fleissig, at the helm, Waterfront Toronto issued a 240 
request-for-proposal (RFP) in March 2017 for “an Innovation and Funding Partner that … will help create 241 
and fund a globally-significant community that will showcase advanced technologies, building materials, 242 
sustainable practices and innovative business models that demonstrate pragmatic solutions toward 243 
climate positive urban development” (Waterfront Toronto, 2017, p.6). Alphabet’s subsidiary, SL, was the 244 
successful bidder. 245 
Will Fleissig, who stepped down in July 2018, repeatedly referred to SL as a “partner” and the plan for 246 
Quayside as a “joint venture”. One local commentator however argued that this was not the case, but in 247 
fact that he was so mesmerised by SL’s smart city discourse of disruption that: 248 
“In the name of speed and innovation, he blew off the agency’s meticulously cultivated 249 
relationships with the members of the public who have been thoroughly engaged with Waterfront 250 
Toronto’s work for almost a generation” (Lorinc, 2018, para.10).  251 
Waterfront Toronto later admitted to communicating and providing more information to SL and a few 252 
other bidders compared to other parties prior to the issuing of the Request for Proposal (RFP), and were 253 
additionally criticised by Ontario’s Auditor General for the short six week time frame to respond to the 254 
call compared to previous RFPs, for not consulting with other levels of government prior to signing an 255 
initial agreement with SL, as well as a lack of time (a weekend) for the Board of Waterfront Toronto to 256 
review the initial Framework Agreement (OAG, 2018). Once signed, the scope of the project proceeded to 257 
rapidly evolve over 16 months, with the scale of the project growing from 4.9 hectares to 77 hectares to 258 
include proposals for two smart neighbourhoods situated within a wider Innovative Development and 259 
Economic Acceleration (IDEA) district (Image 1). The proposal initially envisions the development of the 260 
original Quayside site, comprising housing for 4,200 residents to be followed by the redevelopment of a 261 
portion of Villiers Island, to be called Villiers West. Villiers West would include housing for 2,700 people 262 
along with an estimated 7,400 jobs located within a 1.5 million square foot innovation campus for applied 263 
urban innovation research which would include a new Google headquarters. To facilitate this 264 
development the “list of roles Sidewalk Labs envisions for itself [grew] to include: planning partner; real 265 
estate research and development; real estate economic development catalyst; infrastructure financing; 266 
horizontal development partner; advanced infrastructure facilitator; technology deployment; investments 267 
in economic development, and value sharing” (Robinson & Coutts, 2019, p.339). The Ontario Auditor 268 
General’s Report ultimately concluded that Waterfront Toronto’s “new agreement with Sidewalk Labs 269 
raises concerns in areas such as consumer protection, data collection, security, privacy, governance, 270 
antitrust and ownership of intellectual property” (OAG, 2018, p.649). 271 
  
Image 1: Proposed Sidewalk Labs IDEA district1 (©OpenStreetMap contributors under the Open Database 272 
Licence – CC BY-SA: https://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright) 273 
 274 
When SL’s draft Master Innovation and Development Plan (MIDP) was published in June 2019, it laid out a 275 
1,500 page vision for Quayside as well as the neighbouring Villiers West district of the waterfront 276 
(Sidewalk Toronto, 2019). The MIDP includes a raft of proposals designed to pilot new technology and 277 
building methods, including the use of timber for high-rise construction, adaptable ‘loft’ spaces with 278 
flexible wall panels, clean thermal grid, smart underground disposal system for waste, weather-adaptable 279 
buildings, new mobility services, and modular pavement systems, to name a few – all managed through a 280 
series of sensors integrated throughout the development (Sidewalk Toronto, 2019). Spread over three 281 
volumes (The Plans; The Urban Innovations; and The Partnership) it outlines three key ideas as distilled by 282 
Waterfront Toronto which produced a ‘Note to Reader’ to aid the public in understanding the extensive 283 
proposal, as no executive summary was provided by SL (Waterfront Toronto, 2019a). The first relates to 284 
the proposed expansion of the project through the creation of an IDEA (Innovative Design and Economic 285 
Acceleration) District spanning 77 hectares that SL argues is necessary to meet Waterfront Toronto’s 286 
required priority outcomes. The proposed district would be overseen by a public administrator who 287 
reports to Government, an innovation framework that would allow for necessary regulatory and legal 288 
changes as well as design innovations, and the provision of a range of financial tools to help fund 289 
infrastructure.  Secondly, four roles are proposed for SL: 1) Lead real estate and advanced infrastructure 290 
developer for Quayside and adjacent Villiers West; 2) Chief advisor on incremental changes to technical 291 
and regulatory innovation and design standards as the project develops; 3) The delivery of new 292 
 
1 Image represents current site conditions. Proposed flood protection measures are not represented. 
  
technological solutions; 4) An optional role in financing local and advanced infrastructure and a new light 293 
rail line jointly with the different levels of government. Finally, a financial structure for the development is 294 
included in relation to real estate, infrastructure, and intellectual property. The process leading up to the 295 
MIDP’s creation and subsequent proposals were however met with varied levels of suspicion, to which we 296 
now turn. 297 
4. Disrupting the (Smart) City Narrative 298 
4.1. From Public to Private Interest on the Waterfront 299 
Since its inception, Waterfront Toronto’s lack of key financial and legal powers saw it focus on facilitation, 300 
consultation, and strategic planning through the establishment of relationships with a wide array of 301 
Toronto stakeholders (Bellas & Oliver, 2016). Despite this long history of openness, Waterfront Toronto 302 
behaved in an extraordinarily secretive manner in its early dealings with SL when Will Fleissig was the 303 
CEO. For example, Goodman and Powles (2019) note: 304 
• Agreements between Waterfront Toronto and SL were kept private and not subject to freedom of 305 
information requests, with the original terms of the partnership kept hidden from the public eye for 306 
nine and-a-half months. Additionally, the terms of the MIDP were kept largely secret until they were 307 
announced in July 2019; 308 
• Public engagement exercises were often managed by SL, lacking specifics and accountability to the 309 
public; 310 
• Despite the resignations of high-profile advisors to the project and public opposition, there were no 311 
identifiable reflections or alterations to plans and processes. 312 
The secretive nature of the planning process and the deferential disposition of Waterfront Toronto to SL 313 
is all the more difficult to fathom given the scale of resources that the public sector was committing to the 314 
project. SL had made no secret of the fact that it had no interest in the project unless public funding was 315 
made available to invest in flood protection infrastructure and in a Light Rail network (Sauter, 2018; 316 
Deschamps, 2019). Government had already committed CAD$1.25 billion to the former, while the latter 317 
project remains to be worked out, with Sidewalk Labs’ CEO proclaiming that “at the end of the day, if 318 
there is no light rail through the project, then the project is not interesting to us” (Deschamps, 2019, 1). 319 
Doctoroff made the claim following criticism of leaked documents from Sidewalk Labs that suggested the 320 
company could help to finance the light rail project if the city was willing to provide a portion of property 321 
taxes, development fees and increased land value stemming from the development to Sidewalk Labs 322 
(Oved, 2019). 323 
Aside from the issue of public funds, arguably the most important concern of all has been the potential 324 
privatisation of personal data collected as part of the project. Criticism has come from multiple angles, 325 
with the MIDP being criticised by Waterfront Toronto’s arms-length Digital Strategy Advisory Panel, made 326 
up of experts from academia, industry, the civic technology community and law, who argued that the 327 
issue of data governance should not be decided by Sidewalk Labs but rather “the development of data 328 
governance for this project - including assessment of whether a data trust in an appropriate vehicle - 329 
should, going forward, be led by Waterfront Toronto and its government partners (Waterfront Toronto’s 330 
Digital Strategy Advisory Panel, 2019, 24). One of the most prominent and tenacious critics of the SL 331 
proposals for data governance has been Bianca Wylie, who argues that the rules and regulations of public 332 
governance need to catch up with big tech practice because they were fashioned in the pre-internet era 333 
(Bliss, 2018). She also challenged the underlying narrative of the whole project, saying: “Let’s take a 334 
minute here to stop and reframe the narrative. This is not an urban planning project, it’s a technology 335 
project. As for a technology project, the biggest issue is not privacy, it’s governance” (Wylie, 2018, paras. 336 
  
18-19). Re-asserting the role of public governance is not easy when all three levels of government – at 337 
city, provincial and federal level – have been enthusiastic advocates of the partnership with SL. To date 338 
therefore the main public critics of the project have come from the realm of urban civil society. 339 
4.2. Civil Society Reactions 340 
Scholars have argued that public governance is under threat in Toronto from a combination of 341 
privatisation (of personal data and intellectual property), domination (through rights-of-way and tech 342 
interfaces), and platformization (where the city becomes beholden to SL’s private platform) (Goodman & 343 
Powles, 2019). These themes are echoed within the city’s civil society where reactions to SL’s plans have 344 
been triggered at two levels, locally and nationally. At the local level one of the main organised reactions 345 
has been the formation of BlockSidewalk, which it says is a campaign to develop Toronto’s waterfront for 346 
the benefit of Torontonians, not corporate shareholders. The civil group is calling on Waterfront Toronto 347 
to reject a business deal with SL, and reset the planning for Toronto's eastern waterfront, “this time with 348 
planning, procurement and consultation remaining firmly in public hands” (Blocksidewalk.ca, 2019, 349 
para.1).  350 
At the national level the Canadian Civil Liberties Association is suing the three levels of government that 351 
collectively control Waterfront Toronto to halt the potential privatisation of personal data. In an open 352 
letter to the Federal, Ontario, and Toronto governments, the CCLA said that Sidewalk Toronto and the 353 
Quayside project should be reset, until all three levels of government, after adequate public consultation, 354 
have established:  355 
“digital data governance policies for the appropriate collection, ownership, use and residency of 356 
personal information and other data obtained from public places in any embedded sensor laden, 357 
data harvesting Smart City contemplated for Quayside.” (CCLA, 2019, para.3).  358 
In contrast, the Toronto Region Board of Trade claims that there is popular support for the SL plan 359 
because, in a poll it commissioned, 55% of residents supported the Quayside project and 76% believed 360 
that it should proceed "if the public interest can be safeguarded as the process unfolds" (Wray, 2019, 361 
para.3).  362 
However these differences are ultimately resolved, it is clear that Toronto has acquired an international 363 
reputation for hosting a smart city model that is top-down and tech-driven, a model that is being 364 
compared unfavourably with other cities. In Barcelona, for example, the city government is pioneering a 365 
citizen-centric design, asserting citizens’ “digital sovereignty” by emphasizing civic participation, social 366 
impact and public return (March & Ribera-Fumaz, 2018). Its chief technology officer was keen to contrast 367 
Barcelona’s approach to applying technology to solve existing everyday problems versus SLs’ technology 368 
first mindset (Thornhill, 2019). 369 
Scholars are also comparing the two cities with respect to the ethics of smart city design. As Rob Kitchen 370 
has argued: “Whereas Toronto appears to treat ethics in a procedural way, the Barcelona Digital City 371 
Initiative is designed to be open, inclusive, and participatory in practice and ambition” (Kitchen, 2019, 372 
para.5). He goes on to argue that Barcelona’s approach aims to push back against the marketisation of 373 
local infrastructure, services, and data while seeking to re-define smart cities as places founded on 374 
transparency, rights, and community. This leads us to now consider the role of the planner in the 375 
development of Toronto’s smart city. 376 
4.3. What Role for the Urban Planner? 377 
As the SL project has developed there has been a distinct lack of involvement by urban planners, at least 378 
publicly. The MIDP broadly aligns to and builds on a wide range of planning strategies that have already 379 
  
been produced, such as the city’s TOcore Building for Liveability (City of Toronto, 2018), Complete Streets 380 
Guidelines (City of Toronto, 2019), and guidelines around privately-owned publicly accessible spaces (City 381 
of Toronto, 2014) as well as Waterfront Toronto targets for affordable housing provision. The Quayside 382 
and Villiers West neighbourhoods are covered by two city approved precinct plans, the ‘East Bayfront’ 383 
and the ‘Keating Channel’. Both plans involved extensive engagement with key stakeholders, residents, 384 
businesses, the city and associated agencies over several years (Waterfront Toronto, 2005; 2010). While it 385 
is common for precinct plans to evolve and become more concrete as individual projects develop, our 386 
preceding discussion highlights a number of concerns regarding the lack of engagement with Waterfront 387 
Toronto’s Board, the City of Toronto, its associated agencies such as the public transportation provider, 388 
nearby residents, surrounding land owners, and businesses. SL and Waterfront Toronto both viewed the 389 
MIDP as a draft which is intended to evolve following further consultation.  390 
Based on an assessment by Waterfront Toronto (2019), the MIDP generally conforms to the two existing 391 
precinct plans in relation to the provision of community facilities, connectivity, and role of the main 392 
arterial right-of-way running through the site. The MIDP diverges from the two precinct plans by 393 
proposing lower levels of density, building height, and on-site parking but higher levels of non-residential 394 
uses as well as differences in proposed building mass and built form. Overall, the ‘plan’ components of 395 
the MIDP align to the planning principles established in the two precinct plans but the focus of the plan 396 
heavily favours proposed ‘techno-centric’ innovations such as noise and air quality nuisance monitoring, 397 
active stormwater management, smart pavements, and autonomous vehicles all of which rely on a variety 398 
of sensors to capture and then process data in real-time (Sidewalk Toronto, 2019). Unsurprisingly, it is the 399 
data collection and monitoring proposals that have been the most controversial in the public eye. In 400 
response to criticism about who would have access to neighbourhood generated data, SL proposed the 401 
creation an independent Urban Data Trust to manage access. But the proposal continues to raise 402 
concerns, with critics arguing that SL should not be the ones directing the creation of the trust and the 403 
Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner noting in an open letter to Waterfront Toronto that 404 
current proposals have “a lack of independent public oversight, a cumbersome mandate that overlaps 405 
with that of my office and the federal Privacy Commissioner, and an insufficient role for the City given its 406 
experience delivering 10 municipal services in the public interest” (OIPC, 2019, p.9-10). 407 
Applying a procedural view of the public interest to SLs planning process to date, there is much lacking. 408 
From March 2017 to October 2019, the techno-utopianism (Wiig, 2015; Söderström et al., 2014) narrative 409 
in Toronto has seen SL as the inevitable victor in the bidding process, a limited engagement with 410 
stakeholders, an over-reaching in terms of scope of the plan, and lead architect of proposed new 411 
institutions of governance. Filling the governance void, Toronto’s civil society sought to push back and 412 
argue for the public interest via a citizen-centric narrative advocating for data protection, civil rights, and 413 
enhanced governance mechanisms. Usually quite visible during the re-development of neighbourhoods 414 
the traditional roles of the planner during this period have been superseded by data scientists, public 415 
relations officers, businesses, and civic society in the SLs public debate.  416 
Substantively, SLs’ proposed urban innovations include a number of laudable goals, but too often the 417 
emphasis is placed on the technological innovation rather than a careful examination of the outcome of 418 
the intervention. Here too planners were largely absent in the public debate about the merits of the 419 
urban innovations and the impact they might have on those who will live and engage with the proposed 420 
neighbourhood. Beyond issues of data privacy, there are wider concerns to which planners may yet lend 421 
their voices at the formative stages of plan evaluation, including the impact on disadvantaged members of 422 
the community, cost-effectiveness, political acceptability, and viability. The future suggests planners may 423 
however have a stronger role. 424 
At the end of October 2019 Waterfront Toronto issued its response to the MIDP and subsequent 425 
agreement with SLs. In a two-page open-letter Waterfront Toronto Chair Steven Diamond provided a 426 
  
harsh rebuke of key aspects of the proposals, stating their “concerns were rooted in our public interest 427 
mandate” (Waterfront Toronto, 2019b, para. 6). The agreement saw the amount of land reduced back 428 
down to the original 4.9 hectares, elimination of the Urban Data Trust proposal, decline of SLs’ request for 429 
new governance mechanisms, reversal of SLs from lead developer to partner, no requirement for a LRT-430 
line as a precondition, expansion of patent rights for Canadian companies, and entitlement of Waterfront 431 
Toronto to a share of intellectual property based on the percentage of revenues as opposed to profits. 432 
Also agreed was the creation of a public agency to house data gathered from the project and 433 
acknowledgement that ‘digital proposals’ may be reviewed through public meetings and require 434 
government approvals (Waterfront Toronto, 2019c). On this last point city planners may yet play a key 435 
role in constructing and then protecting the public interest as the process shifts from broad debates on 436 
governance to the details of by-laws, policy, legislation and process. 437 
5. Conclusion 438 
While acknowledging the contested nature of the concept of the public interest, engagement by planners 439 
in the public debate about the procedural and substantive public interest dimensions of the proposed SL 440 
plan have to date been limited. Instead, Toronto’s rise as a technology hub on the global stage initially 441 
shifted the focus away from the public interest and towards the corporate ideals of smart urbanism, with 442 
less public attention being paid to the traditional planning components of the plan. The very public clash 443 
between corporate and civil society on Toronto’s waterfront risked a winner-take-all battle for the future 444 
smart city. Given the capitulation of SLs to Waterfront Toronto’s demands it appears citizen-centric 445 
narratives of the smart city have won the first round.  446 
The general lack of direct engagement by planners in the smart city debate however suggests a need for 447 
cities to fashion new multi-disciplinary teams in which urban planning functions are blended with digital 448 
innovation functions and data analytics expertise so that planning is reimagined for the digital era. 449 
Lessons from the preceding case study also suggests there is a need to further explore the ways in which 450 
municipal activism and civic engagement are harnessed in smart city debates to advocate for the public 451 
interest. While future research should focus on the multi-scalar nature of planning policy to understand 452 
how local plans are aligned with and supported by national regulations on data privacy and data 453 
governance. 454 
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